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I used to think that the brain was the most wonderful organ in the body. 
But then I thought, who’s telling me this.1
Thinking seriously about academic freedom, including reading Matthew 
W. Finkin’s and Robert C. Post’s provocative For the Common Good: Principles of 
American Academic Freedom, is an existential experience. As they note, “Academic 
freedom, if it is to do the hard work of protecting faculty from the waves of 
repression that periodically sweep through the American polity, must explain 
why scholars ought to enjoy freedoms that other members of the public do not 
possess” (44). They argue that academics should not make an individual rights-
based claim to justify this additional freedom. Instead, they demonstrate that 
the benefits and responsibilities of academic freedom derive from membership 
in a professional community of scholars committed to the cultivation and 
dissemination of knowledge. “Academic freedom,” they stress, “is not the 
freedom to speak or to teach just as one wishes. Rather, it is the freedom to 
pursue the scholarly profession, inside and outside the classroom, according 
to the norms and standards of that profession” (149). Rather than being free to 
be you and me, we’re free to be us. But who are we?
Finkin and Post turn to history, not constitutional law, to answer this 
question of professional identity. Emphasizing that “we address professional 
understandings of academic freedom, rather than the constitutional law of academic 
freedom,” (9) they survey the origins of the concept of academic freedom, the 
creation of a foundational text (i.e., the 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic 
Freedom and Academic Tenure), and its later codification and explication. Separate 
chapters then analyze the four domains of modern academic freedom: 
protecting freedom of speech and publication, freedom in the classroom, 
1. Quoted in N. Katharine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, 
Literature, and Informatics (University of Chicago Press 1999).
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freedom of intramural speech (i.e., faculty speech about his or her institution’s 
practices), and freedom of extramural speech (i.e., a faculty member speaking 
in his or her capacity as a citizen). This slim volume is essential reading.
Finkin and Post provide an exceptionally American answer to the question 
of who we are. After tracing the origins of the concept of academic freedom 
from the suppression of ideas in the book of Exodus to the crystallization of the 
German ideal of akademische Freiheit in the 18th and 19th centuries, they demonstrate 
why this German concept could not be transplanted in American institutional 
soil. The German ideal, which “combined autonomy for the university as a 
self-governing body and freedom of teaching and learning,” assumed that 
professors were highly esteemed civil servants entrusted to cultivate knowledge 
(22). Their American counterparts did not share this exalted status. They were 
considered employees of institutions, most of which were governed by boards 
of trustees. This meant that non-scholars, in many instances, could determine 
“what should and should not be taught, what should and should not be 
published” (24–25). The American scholar, especially one who challenged the 
tenets of laissez-faire capitalism in the Gilded Age, risked unemployment.
The ensuing struggle to redefine the place of the scholar in the United 
States led to the American Association of University Professors’ 1915 
Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure. Drafted primarily 
by economist Edwin R. A. Seligman and philosopher Arthur O. Lovejoy, this 
document served “as the first systematic articulation of the logic and structure 
of academic freedom in America” (30). A Progressive Era paean to expertise, 
science, and the organic nature of modern civilization, the declaration asserted 
that scholars, by creating the knowledge necessary for progress and social 
betterment, worked for the public good. To do this vital work properly, they 
required more protections in the workplace than a factory worker or even the 
president of a university. Significantly (and ironically in light of early 20th 
century campaigns to rein in the power of judges), the declaration argued 
that scholars should be treated like federal judges. Once appointed, a scholar 
should have freedom of thought and utterance. Just as a federal judge worked 
in a judicial system and followed specific rules, the scholar, too, was part of a 
system with norms. It was the responsibility of academics, as the declaration 
contended, to police the necessary conditions to produce knowledge.
It is worth noting how comfortably this declaration of principles fit with 
early 20th century American conceptions of citizenship. As Christopher 
Capozzola has argued, “In the years before the [First World War], voluntary 
associations—clubs, schools, churches, parties, unions—organized much of 
American public life. Such groups provided social services, regulated the 
economy, policed crime, and managed community norms. Schooled in this 
world of civic voluntarism, Americans formed their social bonds—and their 
political obligations—first to each other and then to the state. Indeed, in the 
absence of formal federal institutions, these voluntary associations sometimes 
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acted as the state.”2 Americans of this era, including academics, structured 
their lives around collective undertakings. This included a strong belief in the 
obligation of responsible speech, especially during perilous times. Thus, the 
core components of academic freedom in the United States took root before 
the later creation of modern First Amendment jurisprudence.
Many of the core principles from this Progressive Era declaration were later 
codified in the 1940 Statement of Principles of Academic Freedom and Tenure, which more 
than 200 organizations now endorse, and which has helped to nationalize 
standards and practices in the United States. Today, a scholar who moves from 
a small college to a large university can expect his or her new institutional 
home to have a familiar commitment to academic freedom.
The problem, according to Finkin and Post, is that “American principles 
of academic freedom have become a victim of their own success” (5). We no 
longer debate whether academic freedom should exist, but instead treat these 
principles as “a ‘folkway,’ a warm and vaguely fuzzy privilege assumed by 
faculty as a ‘God-given right’ without careful attention to its hard requirements 
and logical implications”(6). Moreover, many academics either assume or 
believe that academic freedom has always been or should be an individual right 
rooted in the First Amendment. Finkin and Post argue that this individualistic 
rationale for academic freedom would undermine public support and destroy 
the socially constructed and legally enforced conditions necessary to produce 
knowledge. Consequently, they ask their fellow academics to reject this 
dangerous path and instead revisit the foundational principles of American 
academic freedom.
This splendid book is much more than a careful parsing and celebration 
of a canonical text from the Progressive Era. It also introduces the reader 
to the decisions of Committee A of the American Association of University 
Professors. Since 1915, this committee has been investigating and reporting 
its findings on alleged violations of academic freedom. After the adoption of 
the 1940 Statement, Committee A has been responsible for interpreting its 
meaning. “As the reasoned conclusions of an especially knowledgeable body, 
the opinions of Committee A offer an usually rich resource for understanding 
the meaning of academic freedom in America” (51). “These decisions,” Finkin 
and Post argue, “provide a rich and useful common law of academic freedom” 
(6). Although these decisions do not bind judges or university administrators, 
they argue that academics should treat them as valuable precedents. Thus, 
almost a century after American academics compared themselves to federal 
judges, now academic lawyers are leading the campaign to educate their fellow 
scholars about academic freedom. This development alone speaks volumes 
about the place of the law school in the research university.
Freedom of research and publication, according to Finkin and Post, 
demonstrate the success of the idea of academic freedom as well as its gravest 
threat. Although there is public support for freedom of inquiry and speculation 
2. Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the 
Modern American Citizen 7 (Oxford University Press 2008).
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as essential ingredients in the process of creating new knowledge, they fear 
that a culture of antinomianism encourages faculty to think about academic 
freedom as an individual right instead of a collective right of professional 
exploration. Embracing an individual rights defense, they argue, would 
needlessly jettison a tried and true defense of academic freedom against public 
regulation. As they explain:
The external defense of academic freedom will collapse if faculty lose faith 
in the professional norms necessary to define and generate knowledge. The 
traditional ideal of freedom of research and publication can be sustained 
only if those who exercise the prerogative of peer review interpret disciplinary 
standards in a manner that maintains the internal legitimacy of these standards. 
The interpretation of these norms will thus predictably and appropriately 
be influenced by the need to preserve sufficient social cohesion within the 
profession to sustain the authority of these norms. As a practical matter, 
successful institutions of peer review will therefore maintain a sensible and 
wise equilibrium between innovation and stability. The ultimate constraint, 
however, is whether peer reviewers apply disciplinary norms that over time 
produce credible forms of knowledge (60–61).
This is a powerful and pragmatic argument about the importance of 
professional standards to maintain the integrity of knowledge production. It 
also reflects academic life in the modern law school, in which many faculty 
members now publish in peer-reviewed journals and many also hold Ph.D.’s 
in other disciplines.
It is also fascinating to see academic lawyers discuss undergraduate 
teaching, including the selection of topics, calls for more political balance in 
the classroom, and concerns about creating hostile teaching environments. 
Since their method uses the investigations of Committee A to shed light on 
fundamental principles, their findings remind us that the past is a prolonged 
and often painful prologue. The overall lesson is simple: “Academic freedom 
obligates scholars to use disciplinary standards, not political standards, to 
guide their teaching” (104). Yet, the academic socialization of students can be 
a brutal business. For example, they declare, “Faculty must respect students as 
persons, but they needn’t respect ideas, even ideas held by students. In higher 
education no idea is immune from potentially scathing criticism. If a student 
identifies with his own ideas, he might well experience ruthless critique of 
these ideas as a personal assault. But it is precisely the pedagogical purpose 
of higher education to introduce critical distance between students and their 
own ideas” (105). There are, of course, different pedagogical approaches to 
teaching an introductory undergraduate course and torts. And differences 
between a law student and a freshman!
Intramural and extramural expressions constitute the final two domains of 
academic freedom. The former focuses on a faculty member discussing his 
or her institution’s policy, but does not involve disciplinary expertise. This 
freedom allows for academics to participate actively in the governance of 
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their institutions and is the cornerstone of the ideal of faculty governance. It 
is also the shortest and most straightforward chapter in For the Common Good. 
Finkin and Post tell the story of the concept’s emergence, crystallization, and 
culmination in the 1966 Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities.
The freedom of extramural expression, as Finkin and Post acknowledge, 
is “the most theoretically problematic aspect of academic freedom” (127). 
“Why should faculties,” they ask, “be free to speak in public in ways that 
damage their institutions, even if such speech is by hypothesis unprotected 
by freedom of research or intramural expression?”(131) To cite a personal 
example, I appeared on The O’Reilly Factor in the fall of 2008 to explain why I 
signed a petition in support of William Ayers.3 Teaching at a public university 
in a state that was a battleground during the presidential election with many 
strong feelings on both sides, I knew that my appearance might anger some. 
According to the 1915 and 1940 Declarations, I should have been cautious before 
making such an appearance. Both declarations approached extramural speech 
from the perspective of the responsible speech tradition. For instance, the 1940 
Declaration announced:
College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned profession, 
and officers of an educational institution. When they speak or write as citizens, 
they should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but their 
special position in the community imposes special obligations. As scholars 
and educational officers, they should remember that the public may judge 
their profession and their institution by their utterances. Hence they should 
at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show 
respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate 
that they are not speaking for the institution (quoted on 131).
It was not until 1970 that the American Association of University Professors 
and the Association of American Colleges revised this language. It now reads: 
“The controlling principle is that a faculty member’s expression of opinion as 
a citizen cannot constitute grounds for dismissal unless it clearly demonstrates 
the faculty member’s unfitness for his or her position. Extramural utterances 
rarely bear upon the faculty members’ fitness for the position” (131). Judging 
from the e-mails that I received, some people believed that anyone defending 
Ayers was categorically unfit to teach. I should note that former University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas President David Ashley called me to offer his full support.
At the time that I defended Ayers on academic freedom grounds, I did 
not consider carefully why I had the freedom to speak extramurally. Like 
many of the intended readers of For the Common Good, I assumed that it was a 
First Amendment right. As it turns out, it was a good thing, institutionally 
speaking, that I didn’t have to worry about participating in a heated story 
during a national election. Over time, it turns out Committee A has repeatedly 
3. William Ayers, Distinguished Professor of Education and Senior University Scholar at the 
University of Illinois at Chicago, had been a leader of the radical anti-Vietnam War group, 
the Weather Underground.
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emphasized that punishing faculty for their extramural speech can create a 
climate in which academics cannot perform their essential tasks. They worry 
too much about what they should or should not say. The solution, from the 
perspective of Committee A, is to allow only faculty, not public constituencies, 
to determine questions of professional competence.
I think that my own experience attests to the value of reading this 
sophisticated book. As academics, we should be able to articulate why we 
have additional freedoms. But we also want to work at institutions where we 
don’t have to exercise our right to intramural speech to protect our extramural 
utterances. Yet, this is a book by academics for academics. It may help to protect 
academic freedom from internal threats, but as the history of Committee A 
suggests, there will always be another, external battle.
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